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 The Principle of  Transparency and Access to Documents in the EU: for what, 




Abstract: Written as a chapter for the third edition of the Traité de Droit Administratif Européen, 
directed by Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère and Jean Bernard Auby (Bryulant, forthcoming), this 
paper characterizes transparency as an ambivalent principle of EU law and governance, serving 
both a functional and a democratic rationale. The analysis focuses on the right of access to 
documents, a right whose scope and democratic function very much depend on who requests and 
on the interpretation of the exceptions to access. While the former is a matter of practice, the latter 
is essentially the result of the main approaches that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has followed hitherto: strict interpretation and application of the exceptions, on the one 
hand, and general presumptions of non-disclosure, on the other. The paper presents both. It 
argues that, while much criticized in the literature as contrary to the democratic function of the 
regulation on access to documents, general presumptions of non-disclosure merit a more nuanced 
analysis. They can be, under restricted circumstances, a way to protect the democratic function of 
the citizen’s right to access. Yet, the uncertain and evolving criteria for the establishment of a 
general presumption of non-disclosure have effectively carved out whole categories of documents 
from the possibility of access, insulating significant sections of EU public action from the pressure 
of democratic claims. Overall, the right of access to documents, as ancillary to a principle of 
democracy, has a limited capacity to change the nature of the polity and of the system of 
governance in which it is embedded. 
1. Introduction 
A person interested in, but unfamiliar with, the European Union, trying to understand its 
functioning, its ethos, its policies, the intricacies of its decision-making process, is confronted with 
a wealth of information and with multiple sources where more documents can be found. Public 
reports, guidance documents, programmes and strategies, are routinely made public informing 
experts in EU affairs and the general public, in constant flows of information that overwhelm. 
                                               
* Professor of Comparative Administrative Law, University of Luxembourg. Thanks are due to Leonor Rossi for 
useful comments and to Martin Petschko, for excellent research assistance. The chapter refers to the law as it stood 
in January, 30th 2020, without aiming at a comprehensive coverage of the case law on access to documents. 
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Registers and databases of the EU institutions, in addition to information made available on 
request, allow one to access working documents, agendas, minutes and voting details of various 
meetings, webstream public sessions (for example, of the Council of Ministers)1 and, eventually, 
to reconstruct decision-making procedures. If transparency stands for availability of information, 
by all means the EU is a transparent polity. If, in a mode demanding reading, transparency stands 
for the availability of norms and mechanisms that rule conflicts of interests, frame lobbying 
activities, and induce ethical rules of behavior on the part of decision-makers, also on this front – 
the remaining shortcomings notwithstanding – one may point to the rules of procedure and codes 
of conduct of the institutions, but also to the stalled negotiations on a mandatory lobbying 
register.2 Prima facie, one could argue that transparency is an everyday reality, anchored in the 
norms and practices that have evolved over the years of EU integration. But this statement, of 
course, only tells part of the story. Shortcomings both in norms and practices are reflected in court 
litigation and in Ombudsman’s inquiries.3 More recent initiatives of the EU institutions, too, 
indicate the continuous need to address perennial problems, such as the transparency of the 
expertise provided by scientific committees and conflicts of interests that may fraught decision-
making.4  
The principle of transparency in the law of the EU continues in need of being carefully 
woven through adequate legal norms and suitable institutional practices, positing normative 
change. In its current constitutional framework, the direction of such change is unequivocal: 
transparency is ancillary to democracy and EU law should be shaped progressively to enable it. 
                                               
1 https://video.consilium.europa.eu/en/webcasts  
2 European Parliament Decision on the general revision of Parliament's Rules of Procedure (2016/2114(REG), 
13.12.2016, and European Parliament Decision on amendments to Parliament’s Rules of Procedure affecting Chapters 
1 and 4 of Title I; Chapter 3 of Title V; Chapters 4 and 5 of Title VII; Chapter 1 of Title VIII; Title XII; Title XIV 
and Annex II (2018/2170(REG), 31.01.2019, tightening the rules on the transparency register and making 
amendments directed at ensuring transparency throughout decision-making processes; Commission Decision 
C/2018/0700, of 31 January 2018, on a Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission OJ C 65, 
21.2.2018, p. 7–20; Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a Mandatory Transparency Register, COM(2016) 
627 final, Brussels, 28.9.2016. 
3 See, further, Sections 3 and 4 below. This chapter will focus on the case law analysis. For an overview of the work 
of the European Ombudsman in the area of transparency, see, e.g. N. VOGIATZIS, The European Ombudsman and Good 
Administration in the European Union, Palgrave, 2018, Chapter 5; H. MICHEL, « Le Médiateur Européen Héraut de la 
Transparence. Redéfinition d’une Institution et Investissements Politiques d’une Norme de « Bon » Gouvernement », 
Politique Européenne, 2018/3, Vol. 61, 2018, pp. 114 -141; D. DRAGOS AND B. NEAMTU, « Freedom of Information in 
the EU in the Midst of Legal Rules, Jurisprudence and Ombudsprudence: the European Ombudsman as Developer 
of Norms of Good Administration », European Constitutional Law Review, Vol.13(4), 2017, pp. 641-672. 
4 Regulation (EU) 2019/1381 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on the transparency 
and sustainability of the EU risk assessment in the food chain (OJ L 231, 6.9.2019, p. 1–28), in particular recitals 34 
and 37. See also European Parliament Report on transparency, accountability and integrity in the EU institutions 
(2015/2041(INI)), 30.03.2017. 
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However, this reading ignores the instrumental role of transparency in supporting the effectiveness 
of EU integration and in institutionalizing governing practices anchored in the relationship 
between the EU and interest representatives. The first question one should bear in mind when 
assessing transparency in the EU is “for what?”, since the purposes of transparency are far from 
univocal (Section 2). Against this background of ambivalence, this chapter will analyze the right of 
access to documents to show the legal and practical difficulties in giving effect to a political right 
of democratic imprint in the context of EU integration. These stem from the actual practice of 
requesting documents, since requests are frequently filed by natural and legal persons who seek to 
reap commercial advantages from disclosure. EU law, as a matter of principle, does not allow a 
differentiated treatment of access in this regard. Yet, “for whom” transparency works remains a 
relevant question to assess the ability of the right of access to documents to fulfil its democratic 
rationale (Section 3). The difficulties of realizing this function stem as well from the specific 
functioning of the exceptions that EU law currently envisages. Notwithstanding the principled 
nature of transparency, and the democratic inspiration of the current regulation on access to 
documents, the effective scope on access to documents decisively depends on what is being 
requested and how the competing interests of access and confidentiality play out in each instance. 
Transparency “of what?” will therefore occupy most of the chapter, analyzing the judicial 
interpretation of the exceptions (Section 3) and, through selected examples, how the case law has 
defined concrete borderlines between democracy and confidentiality (Section 4). 
2. Transparency in EU integration: an ambivalent principle 
Transparency has been a normative concern in EU integration at important points of its history. 
While the Treaty of Maastricht and the political union are usually considered the original hallmarks 
of the transparency turn in the EU, the importance given to the visibility of the actions of the 
institutions as a condition for its success was already present in the setting up of the European 
Coal and Steel Community in the mid-1950s. Transparency was an important part of making sure 
that both Member States and undertakings subject to the power exercised by the Community 
institutions, in particular the independent High Authority, would understand and accept it. This 
was essential to the ability of the new Community to affirm itself as a legitimate authority.5 In the 
                                               
5 P.REUTER, La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier, Paris, LGDJ, 1953, p. 76, refering that the common 
market should be a « glass house ». On the ways in which, within the state setting, transparency has become the 
foundation of public action, rather than a means of public action, see J.F. KERLÉO, « Comprendre l’État sous le Regard 
de la Transparence », Droit et Societé, 2019/2, 2019, pp. 379-396, at pp. 382-385 (« la transparence est devenue un 
horizon à atteindre pour tout pouvoir qui cherche à asseoir son autorité sur un fondement légitime », at p. 385) 
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decades that followed, however, when at all a consideration, transparency fulfilled less 
foundational functions. It remained instrumental to the building of the internal market.  
In the 1980s, when the Commission launched its initiative on completion of the internal 
market, lack of transparency was perceived to be a problem for the effective application of 
Community law: the removal of trade barriers required that both Member States be aware of their 
obligations and the “Community citizens” in the know regarding their rights.6 Transparency stood 
here for communication, presupposing access to information but requiring a specific reach-out 
strategy that the Commission avowed to undertake. It took, however, a somewhat strengthened 
form in the 1992 Sutherland Report, which laid the seeds for what later became the Impact 
Assessment Procedure. There, in addition to communication (“targeted as closely as possible on 
particular sections of the public concerned”), transparency appeared as a quality of the Community 
rule-making procedures and came hand in hand with the participation “of those concerned by 
[law]”, namely of consumers and firms.7 The risk seen in interrupting a continuous “dialogue with 
European organisations” was the same that had brought transparency to the forefront of structural 
principles in the ECSC Treaty: “the risk of [Community rules] being perceived as technocratic 
constraints, even as interference […], rather than as contributions to the wider ideal of the internal 
market”.8 Transparency, therefore, came in the guise of openness, presupposing an active stance 
to involve those concerned by legal acts.9 But transparency of Community law meant also 
legislative consolidation, a legislative technique at the service of the rule of law requirement of 
clarity, without which the effectiveness of the internal market legislation could be imperiled.10  
By the time when transparency emerged as one of the cornerstones of the Commission’s 
strategy to ensure the realization of the “ideal of the internal market”, as set out in the Sutherland 
                                               
6 White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final, 
14 June 1985 (Milan, 28-29 June 1985), para 155. 
7 Report to the EEC Commission by the High Level Group on the Operation of the Internal Market, presided over 
by P. SUTHERLAND, « The Internal Market After 1992. Meeting the Challenge », (SEC(92) 2044, 28 October 1992, 
European Report n. 1808, p. 5-6 (and Recommendations 8 and 9). 
8 Ibidem, p. 6. 
9 On the ambiguous relationship between transparency and openness, albeit in the post-Lisbon contest, see A. 
ALEMANNO, « Unpacking the principle of openness in EU law: transparency, participation and democracy », European 
Law Review, 2014, 39(1), 72-90, stressing that openness presupposes “the adoption of a multitude of behaviours on 
the part of the institutions to promote other superior goals” (p. 74).  
10 Under the heading “Transparency of Community Law”, the Reports’ recommendation regarding legislative 
consolidation is compounded with the need to act at the level of transposition of directives – which “pose obvious 
limits to transparency” – and a clear preference for the use of regulations (idem, Recommendations 10, 11 and 13, p. 
7-9).  
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Report,11 the institutional discourse on transparency in the EC/EU had started taking a different 
turn. In 1992, the famous Declaration No. 17 had already been annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, 
holding that transparency “strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s 
confidence in the administration”. When the European Council met late that year (first in 
Birmingham, in the wake of the Danish referendum’s rejection of the Maastricht Treaty, and then 
in Edinburg), it discussed both the recommendations of the Sutherland Report on transparency 
and ways of making the “Community close to its citizens”.12 Soon thereafter transparency found 
a firm legal ground in the Treaty, following the Amsterdam revision in 1999. Access to documents 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission became a right of citizens and of 
natural or legal persons residing or having their registered office in a Member State – a fundamental 
right, after the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000.13 Furthermore, a legal basis 
allowed for the adoption of an act defining the conditions of access to documents – Regulation 
1049/2001, still in force today – and the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
had henceforth the duty to adopt rules of procedure on access to their documents.14 These leads 
were taken up both by litigants before the Court of Justice and by the European Ombudsman, 
which soon became known for its advocacy of access to documents and transparency. From these 
starting points, transparency soon became a hallmark of democracy in the EU, not only in political 
discourse but also as a matter of EU law.15  
Transparency serving “the ideal of the internal market” and transparency as a feature of a 
democratic polity in the making remain present and intertwined ever since in both EU law and 
institutional practice. “Actively [communicating] about what the EU does” in language that is 
“accessible and understandable for the general public” (transparency as communication) became 
a principle of good governance, under the heading of “openness”, proclaimed in the White Paper 
                                               
11 On how the Commission endorsed the Sutherland Report, see Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament - The Operation of the Community’s Internal Market After 1992 Follow-Up 
to the Sutherland Report (Sec/92/2277final), in particular points 44-48. 
12 See Birmingham Declaration (annex I to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, Birmingham, 16 
October 1992), and Presidency Conclusions of the European Council Edinburg, 11-12 December 1992, points 4 and 
16. On these and on the broader context of this period, see, inter alia, H. MICHÈLE, « La Transparence dans L’Union 
Européenne Réalisation de la Bonne Gouvernance et Redéfinition de la Démocratie », Revue Française d’Administration 
Publique, Vol. 2018/1, 2018, pp. 109-126, at p. 112-116. 
13 Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
14 Article 191A of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Regulation No. 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 
145/43. 
15 Regulation 1049/2001, recital 2. Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Turco v Council EU:C:2008:374, 
2005, para 46.  
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on Governance of 2001.16 It went hand in hand with the involvement of “civil society in policy-
making. Combined, transparency and participation were meant to create more confidence in the 
EU institutions and in their policy. Despite the language loosely resonant of democratic ideals 
(“civil society”, “giving voice”, “inclusive” and “accountable” policy-making), it is the 
effectiveness of the integration process that underlines the principles of good governance.17 With 
this ethos, transparency (as well as participation) remains to this day a fundamental part of the 
Commission’s Better Regulation policy, a cornerstone of “improving the quality of legislative 
proposals”.18 In this role, it further justified a series of initiatives, ranging from minimum standards 
of consultation to lobbying regulation, that have changed both how the EU makes law and policy 
and how it relates to interest representatives.19 They institutionalized a way of governing via 
consultation of interest groups, by now broadly accepted in the name of fully informed decision-
making, based on the available knowledge and on an assessment of the variety of views expressed 
(in short, better policy-making), and of the effectiveness of the decisions adopted (which the 
involvement of those affected facilitates).20 While this change was taking form, the Draft Treaty 
establishing the Constitution for Europe prepared the ground for the distinctive constitutional 
language later introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. As a matter of Treaty determination, openness is 
now at the core of the democratic foundations of the Union, being ancillary to representative 
democracy and to participatory democracy (Articles 10(3) and 11(2) TEU), as well as to good 
governance (Article 15(1) TFEU). The legislature’s duty to act publicly (Article 15(2) TFEU) is an 
                                               
16 Communication from the Commission, “European Governance – A White Paper”, COM(2001) 428 final, Brussels, 
25.7.2001, p. 10 and p. 11 (under “Making the way the EU works more open…”). 
17 Ibidem, p. 7. 
18 Communication from the Commission, “Action plan ‘Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment’ 
(COM/2002/0278 final), point 1.1. See too Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Better regulation for 
better results - An EU agenda”, COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015; and Staff working document, “Better 
Regulation: taking stock and sustaining our commitment” COM(2019)178 (available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/better-regulation-taking-stock-and-sustaining-our-commitment_en); 
Interinstitutional Agreement Between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making (OJ L 123/1, 2.5.2016). 
19 Communication from the Commission, “Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue - General 
principles and minimum standards for consultation of interested parties by the Commission”, COM(2002) 704 final, 
Brussels, 11.12.2002, subsequently adapted by a series of communications (see “Better regulation for better results - 
An EU agenda”, COM(2015) 215 final, cit., point 2.1.); and Commission, Green Paper - European transparency 
initiative (COM(2006)0194 final, Brussels, 3.5.2006), including proposals on anti-fraud and financial management and 
on ethical behavior of EU officials. See, more recently, Proposal for an Interinstitutional Agreement on a mandatory 
Transparency Register COM(2016) 627 final, Brussels, 28.9.2016. 
20 See, further, C. ROBERT, « La Politique Européenne de Transparence (2005-2016) : de la Contestation à la 
Consécration du Lobbying », Gouvernment et Action Publique, No 1, 2017, pp. 9-32, for a sociological analysis of this 
transformation. 
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epitome of the constitutional transformation that the Lisbon Treaty meant to introduce, as is, 
arguably, the requirement of an open European administration (Article 298(1) TFEU). 
This brief overview is enough to show what is perhaps one of the core characteristics of 
transparency: its ambivalence. The reasons why, at different moments in the process of EU 
integration, transparency was either an important concern or at the forefront of policy-making are 
varied. Both the vagueness of the concept and the institutional and academic discourses built 
around the role of transparency in the EU make it at times difficult to isolate those reasons, blurred 
in the “overall consensus” surrounding the values of transparency.21 Transparency, in the EU and 
elsewhere, has become “an end in itself” with little questioning about its potential contested sides,22 
except to the extent that the ways of practicing transparency can be criticised, because they fall 
short of transparency’s normative promises.23 Yet, in particular in the EU context, one ought not 
lose sight of “what are we calling for when we call for transparency”.24 Here, the ambivalence of 
transparency is marked by the tension between the functional and the democratic claims that it 
serves. Arguably, in the EU and elsewhere, transparency has been instrumental to a debased 
conception of democracy, where the citizen, often lacking the resources to take up an active role 
of monitoring and participating, is often replaced by interest representatives, by non-governmental 
organisations, and by members of the European Parliament.25 Even without the intimate 
association to participation that transparency has acquired in EU governance, the availability of 
information in itself changes the relationship between the holders of public power and society. It 
makes the former more permeable to external influences and can impinge on the content of the 
decisions taken, either by way of such influences or, more indirectly, of the adjustment by decision-
makers to the expectations of those who will have access to the decision.26 Beyond (and because 
of) the possibilities of control over the exercise of public power, which it facilitates, transparency 
generates asymmetries between public and private actors that need to be acknowledged when 
                                               
21 E. ALLOA, « Transparency: A Magic Concept of Modernity », in E. ALLOA AND D. THOMÄ (eds), Transparency, Society 
and Subjectivity: Critical Perspectives (Palgrave), pp. 21-55, 2018, at pp. 28-29, further stating that “in a society rule by the 
paradigm of transparency, transparency itself represents a blind spot” (at p. 46). 
22 D. E. POZEN, « Transparency’s Ideological Drift », Yale Law Journal, Vol. 128, pp. 100-165, 2018, at p. 103; I. 
KOIVISTO, « The Anatomy of Transparency: The Concept and its Multifarious Implication » EUI Working Papers 
MWP 2016/09, 2016. 
23 For an overview of the literature on the EU, see C. ROBERT, op. cit., p. 11-12. 
24 I. KOIVISTO, op. cit., p. 2.  
25 C. ROBERT, op. cit., p. 34-35. H. MICHEL, « La Transparence dans L’Union Européenne : Réalisation de la Bonne 
Gouvernance et Redéfinition de la Démocratie », Revue Française d’Administration Publique, Vol 2018/1, 2018, pp. 109-
126. 
26 J.F. KERLEO, op. cit., p. 390, 392-3, arguing, in addition, that transparency may be « une cause explicative et 
déterminante des évolutions de la puissance publique » (p. 393). 
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pleading in its favour. At the same time, transparency as ancillary to an ideal of democracy has also 
contributed to give EU decision-making processes characteristics that resemble those of 
representative democracies (e.g. the constitutional determination that the legislature needs to act 
publicly). 
The right of access to documents – transparency’s legal form par excellence – does not 
escape the tension between the functional (an instrument to “promoting the ideal of the internal 
market”) and democratic rationales of transparency, as the reminder of the chapter will show. 
After a general mapping of the right’s legal framework, which endorses its democratic function 
(Section 3.1), a more detailed analysis of those who benefit from access to documents (Section 
3.2) and of the interpretation of the exceptions that can prevent disclosure (Section 3.3) will reveal 
how practice qualifies and delimits the rights’ democratic function. 
3. Access to Documents and the Tensions of EU Integration 
3.1. Institutions, documents and rationale: some preliminary observations 
The right of access to documents is enshrined in Article 42 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and in Article 15(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It is 
exercised in the terms of Regulation 1049/2001, which, in line with the original Article 191A of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, applies only to requests made to the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission.27 Requests on access to documents made to other institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies fall within the scope of the regulation, mostly as a result of voluntary adherence through 
internal rules of procedures or by way of specific legal provisions (in particular in the case of 
agencies).28 Article 15(3) TFEU mirrors this evolution, referring broadly to “Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies”. But, while extending the scope of the right of access to documents, 
it also singled out two institutions and one legal person in this: the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment Bank (EIB) are 
only bound by this right “when exercising their administrative tasks”. Requests of access to 
documents made to these entities are regulated by decisions that implement their obligation under 
Article 15(3) TFEU, and not by Regulation 1049/2001.29 While the rules thereby established may 
                                               
27 Article 1(a) of Regulation 1049/2001; see, in this regard, Judgment of 18 July 2017, Commission v Breyer, Case 
C-213/15 P, EU:C:2017:563, para 37. 
28 See, in more detail, L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA, Public Access to Documents in the EU (Hart Publishing, 2017), 
2017, pp. 72-78. 
29 Decision 2004/258 of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank 
documents (OJ L 80/42, 18.03.2004); see Judgment of 19 December 2019, European Central Bank v Espírito Santo, 
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diverge from those of Regulation 1049/2001 in significant respects – for example, as a result of 
the respective decisions, neither the CJEU nor the ECB are bound by an obligation to keep a 
register of documents – the case law developed under Regulation 1049/2001 may remain, 
nevertheless, relevant for the interpretation of those decisions. 30  
The objective scope of the Regulation depends on the notion of “documents”, which is 
rather encompassing: documents refers to “any content whatever its medium”, “drawn up or 
received by it and in its possession, in all areas of activity of the European Union” (hence also 
documents authored by other entities).31 Nevertheless, what counts as document can be a 
controversial matter. That is the case, in particular, of access to information contained in databases. 
In this respect, the Court has held that “document” refers to “content that is saved and that may 
be copied or consulted after it has been generated”, covering potentially the entirety of the data 
contained in a database.32 The Court has held that the document requested needs to be an existing 
document, which excludes data that has been deleted or has not yet been added.33 Importantly, the 
technical specificities of a database (whether it allows to extract the information requested without 
substantial investment) can be determinant in defining what counts as an existing document, 
defining also the scope of application of the Regulation.34 Beyond the notion of document, also 
the classification of sensitive documents (subject to specific rules of access under Article 9 of 
                                               
C-442/18 P, EU:C:2019:1117, deciding the case solely on the basis of Decision 2004/258 (see too, on the same case, 
Opinion of AG PIKMÄE delivered on 2 October 2019, C-442/18 P, EU:C:2019:811, para 59 to 66). Decision of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2012 concerning public access to documents held by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions (OJ C 38/2, 9.2.2013); see, in 
this respect, Commission v Breyer, para 47 to 54. The rules applicable to the European Investment Bank are defined in 
guidelines (“The EIB Group Transparency Policy”, 6 March 2015, available at 
https://www.eib.org/attachments/strategies/eib_group_transparency_policy_en.pdf). 
30 In this sense, Judgment of 20 September 2019, Dehousse v Court, Case T-433/17, EU:T:2019:632, para 32 (and 
endorsing the view that the regulation and the decision of the Court pursue the same objective, see Commission v Breyer, 
para 53). For a different view, see Opinion of AG PIKMÄE in European Central Bank v Espírito Santo, cit.. On the lack 
of duty to keep a register, see para 63 and 64 and Case T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, EU:T:2011:634, para 155. 
31 Articles 2(3) and 3(a) of Regulation 1049/2001. If the documents held by the institutions originate from the Member 
States, agreement of the Member State concerned may be required prior to disclosure (Article 4(5) of Regulation 
1049/2001; see, e.g., Judgment of 18 December 2007, Sweden v Commission, C-64/05 P, EU:C:2007:802; and Commission 
v Breyer, para 43). Importantly, those documents are not subject to national law (see in this regard, Opinion of AG 
Bobek, Commission v Breyer, EU:C:2016:994, para 49). Access to documents of third parties, including of other 
institutions, is ruled by Article 4(4) of Regulation 1049/2001 (see, e.g. Judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden and 
Others v API and Commission, C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541; and Commission v Breyer, para 
38). 
32 Dufour v ECB, para 88 and 102 to 118., On the relevance of practical difficulties that may arise in extracting 
documents from a database, see para 121 to 123. 
33 Dufour v ECB, para 128 to 130, 135, 149 and 152 (the requirement of existing document had been formulated in a 
different context in Judgement of 2 October 2014, Strack v Commission, C-127/13P, EU:C:2014:2250, para 38 and 46). 
34 Judgment of 11 January 2017, Typke v Commission, C-491/15 P, EU:C:2017:5, para 35 to 40. 
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Regulation 1049/2001),35 and the limits of access to documents resulting from the exceptions 
established in Article 4 (analysed in more detail below) govern the actual access to documents 
requested. 
The recitals of the regulation express well the democratic rationale that underpinned its 
adoption. Openness, as stated in the Treaty at the time of its adoption, “[marked] a new stage in 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”.36 Furthermore, it contributed 
to strengthening democracy and respect for fundamental rights, as well as to the legitimacy of the 
administration.37 Based on these premises, the regulation was adopted to give the “widest possible 
access to documents”, and privileged access when the institutions act in a legislative capacity.38 To 
this day, the judgment in Turco remains emblematic of the Court’s most progressive stance 
regarding the fulfilment of the democratic function of the right of access to documents that the 
regulation announces. Countering the Council’s claim that disclosure of an opinion of its legal 
service pertaining to a legislative proposal could lead to doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative 
act, the Court upheld “the democratic right of European citizens to scrutinize the information 
which has formed the basis of a legislative act”, holding that openness “contributes to conferring 
greater legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of European citizens and increasing their 
confidence in them by allowing divergences between various points of view to be openly 
debated.”39 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in more detail below, the law and practice of access to 
documents of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, restricts in important respects the 
democratic function of this right. In some cases, the Courts have sought to preserve this function, 
by shielding the exercise of the right from usages that could subvert its democratic rationale. In 
other cases, the case law has arguably contributed to limiting the scope of access to documents in 
ways that reflect the functionalist context in which this right is exercised and that, in addition, 
further the functional ethos of the EU polity. This tension will be further analysed by examining 
                                               
35 See, e.g., D. CURTIN, « Judging EU Secrecy » Cahiers de Droit Européen, Vol. 2, 2012, pp. 457-490; D. CURTIN, « 
Official secrets and the negotiation of international agreements: Is the EU executive unbound? » Common Market Law 
Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2013, pp. 423-457. 
36 Text of what was then Article 1 of the Treaty on the European Union, reproduced in recital 1 of Regulation 
1049/2001. 
37 Recital 2 of Regulation 1049/2001. 
38 Article 1(a) of Regulation 1049/2001 and Recitals 4 and 6 of Regulation 1049/2001. 
39 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 67 and 59. This same point was reiterated in subsequent judgments with equally 
important consequences (e.g. Case T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, EU:T:2018:167, para 78). 
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the extent of transparency, but it is equally present regarding the beneficiaries of the right of access 
to documents. 
3.2. Holders of the right and its active users 
The degree and the object of transparency that the regulation on access to documents allows for 
depends firstly on who can have access. Requests are where access starts. In this respect, the 
regulation is clear, and equally in line with the democratic function of the right: citizens, residents, 
but also legal persons with registered office in a Member State, can have access without needing 
to provide reasons.40 While the document requested needs to be identified in “a sufficiently precise 
manner, to enable the institution to identify the document”, the institutions should also assist the 
applicant in clarifying their application if need be.41  
But the practice of requesting documents reveals, not surprisingly, a reality different from 
the citizen engaged in EU decision-making for the sake of democratic scrutiny. The institutional 
reports on the application of Regulation 1049/2001 reveal that companies, academics and law 
firms represent a very significant proportion of applicants. According to the Commission’s 2018 
annual report, these categories combined represented 39,4% of the total number of initial 
applications, citizens 42.2% and journalists 10.1 %,42 being that the category “citizens” included 
applicants who did not identify their social and occupational profile (which is not compulsory).43 
There is, in fact, no way to know how many citizens, in their quality of citizens, are exercising their 
fundamental right to access documents of the Commission (not least because this data is collected 
on the basis of information provided by the applicants, and the institutions may struggle with 
addressing cases of false identities).44 The classification of applicants made by the Council is 
different but its report reveals a similar picture: 28.8% of applicants making initial requests in 2018 
were academics, followed by 27% belonging to the “civil society/private sector” category (which 
includes “consultants”, “industrial and commercial sector”, NGOs, “other groups of interest”, 
                                               
40 Article 2(1) (its paragraph 2 gives the EU institutions the possibility of granting access also to non-residents or to 
legal persons not legally established in the EU) and Article 6(1) of Regulation 1049/2001. 
41 Article 6(2) of Regulation 1049/2001 (see also paragraphs 3 and 4, equally presupposing an active stance on the part 
of the requested institution). Se, e.g., Case T-436/09, Dufour v ECB, para 29 and 30, where the Court highlights the 
importance of this provision considering the difficulties that citizens may have in identifying documents and considers 
this duty (as enshrined in Decision 2004/258/ECB, cit.) a manifestation of the principle of sound administration. 
42 Report from the Commission on the application in 2018 of Regulation No. 1049/2001 regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, COM(2019) 356 final, Brussels, 29.7.2019, p. 12. Initial 
applications refer to the original requests, which, if access is refused, may be followed by a confirmatory application 
(Article 7(1) and (2) of Regulation 1049/2001). 
43 Ibidem, p. 12 
44 Referring to the problem of false identities, see L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA , op. cit., pp. 43. 
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“environmental lobbies”), 6,9% lawyers and 6.4% journalists.45 As for the Parliament, its report of 
2018 informs us that: “academics and researchers still represent the largest share of applicants 
[…30%...], followed by the business sector, environmental organizations and other interest 
representatives, accounting together for around 12% of applications.”46 Tellingly, combined, they 
form the category “civil society” in the Parliament’s classification. It is followed by lawyers (9%) 
and journalists (5%). While these percentages vary from year to year, the overall picture does not 
appear to change fundamentally.47 Moreover, the industrial sector prevails, by far, and steadily over 
the years, among litigants who seek a judicial remedy for a perceived violation of their right to 
access documents of the EU.48 
The fact that researchers and corporations make a significant part of the requests on access 
to documents in the EU does not per se deny the democratic function of this right – which the 
Court keeps on stressing in its case law.49 The relevance of industry in the exercise of a fundamental 
right – as such protected by the Charter, with all the symbolism that may carry – is not a reality 
that is exclusive of the EU.50 But this is a powerful reminder that transparency serves different 
purposes and is conditioned by “the normative commitments and worldviews of those in a 
position to invoke it”.51 This is particularly noteworthy in a polity deprived of the democratic 
structures of states, where transparency has been one of the carriers of a democratic ethos. Without 
prejudice to transparency’s ability to mould the EU along democratic tenets, it is important to bear 
in mind that many of the usages of the right of access are at best heedless of a democratic purpose. 
From this perspective, the regulation on access to documents, as important as it is, contributes to 
                                               
45 Council of the European Union (Working Party on Information), Seventeenth Annual Report of the Council on 
the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 
2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 7917/19, Brussels, 2 May 
2019, p. 13. 12.1% are “undeclared”, 13.9 are “others”, which in addition to those mentioned in the text are added to 
“public authorities (non-EU institutions, third country representatives, etc.)” with 3.4% of initial requests and 
“Members of European Parliament and assistants” with 1.5% of initial requests. The numbers vary for confirmatory 
applications (see p. 14). 
46 European Parliament’s Annual Report, “Public Access to Documents 2018”, March 2019, p. 11. 
47 L. LEPPÄVIRTA AND H. DARBISHIRE, « The right to ask… the right to know – the successes and failures in access 
to documents rules and practices from an NGO perspective » in C. HARLOW, P. LEINO AND G DELLA CANANEA 
(eds.) Research Handbook on EU Administrative Law (Edward Elgar), 2017, pp. 399-422, at pp. 404-407. 
48 L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA , op. cit., p. 55-59. 
49 See e.g. Judgment of the Court of 4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, Case C-57/16 P, EU:C:2018:660, 
para. 73 to 75. 
50 D. E. POZEN, op. cit., pp. 124-127. 
51 D. E. POZEN, op. cit., pp. 146. 
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shaping a specific type of democracy anchored not on the relationships between citizens and public 
power, but rather on the relationships between specific interest holders and public powers.52 
3.3. The extent of transparency 
Access to documents is not (cannot be) unlimited.53 The protection of both public and private 
legally protected interests may justify withholding access, as specified in Article 4 of Regulation 
1049/2001. This is a central provision of the legal regime on access to EU documents, source of 
a rich case law which, at the end, defines the extent to which access may be granted. The overall 
scheme of Article 4 envisages two types of exceptions, depending on whether the protection of 
the competing public or private interest that may justify a refusal of access is subject or not to a 
public interest test. On the one hand, if access may hinder public interests, such as the protection 
of international relations, of the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Union or of a 
Member State, or the protection of the privacy and integrity of the individual, the institutions 
“shall” refuse access, subject to justification.54 On the other hand, the protection of other 
competing interests (namely: commercial interests, including intellectual property; court 
proceedings and legal advice; the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits; the institution’s 
decision-making process) only justifies refusal of access subject to an examination of whether an 
“overriding public interest” could, nonetheless, justify disclosure.55 It is the applicant who needs 
to invoke the “specific circumstances” that can establish the existence of such an interest and show 
how disclosure would contribute to its protection.56 This is a hurdle that is virtually impossible to 
overcome, in particular given that at the time in which the applicant needs to make this 
demonstration the content of the document is not publicly known. According to the case law, 
reasons of transparency can constitute such overriding public interest, but general considerations 
                                               
52 H. MICHEL, op. cit..  
53 That follows from Article 15(3) TFEU: although the “conditions” of access that need to established by a regulation 
do not need to include exceptions, it is submitted that full transparency without limits is not feasible given the possible 
breach of competing rights. This very normative assertion – access cannot be unlimited – was contested in Judgment 
of 30 January 2020, CBA Spielapparate- Restarantbetrieb GMbH v Commission, Case T-168/17, EU:T:2020:20. Here, the 
applicant submitted that “the exceptions provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 are unlawful, 
since they conflict with higher-ranking primary law, in particular with Articles 42 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union”. The applicant further claimed that, given this conflict between primary and secondary 
law, the Commission should not have applied the exceptions established in the access to documents regulation. Both 
the Council and the Parliament have intervened in support of the European Commission (Order of 18 May 2018 in 
CBA v. Commission, Case T-168/17, para 6) and the Court easily dismissed the applicant’s plea (para 65 to 69). 
54 Article 4(1) of Regulation 1049/2001. 
55 Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation 1049/2001. 
56 E.g. Judgment of 7 February 2018, Access Info Europe v Commission, Case T-852/16, EU:T:2018:71, para 97; CBA v 
Commission, para 55 and 56. 
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do not suffice.57 At least judging from the case law in the already long life of Regulation 1049/2001, 
the possibility of establishing “an overriding public interest” appears to be dead letter.58 Common 
to both types of exceptions is the duty of the institution requested to consider the possibility of 
giving partial access.59  
The way the functioning of the exceptions is interpreted, arguably, determines the extent 
to which the regulation may fulfil its democratic aims. In this regard, the Court of Justice has 
followed two quite distinct approaches, which reflect a different weighing of the interests of 
disclosure and of confidentiality. On the one hand, in line with the democratic rationale of this 
right and, specifically, with the principle of widest possible access to public documents, it has 
consistently held that the exceptions must be “interpreted and applied strictly”.60 On the other 
hand, the Court has admitted that the institutions may rely on general presumptions of non-
disclosure, applying to certain categories of documents, to justify applying one of the exceptions 
established in Article 4. This divide remains one of the core features of the case law regarding 
access to documents and will be explained in more detail below, not least because (as will be 
argued) it also results from the tension between the functional and the democratic character of the 
EU and confirms that access to documents needs to be analyzed in this specific context.  
A. Beyond a strict interpretation of the exceptions: the first steps of general presumptions of non-disclosure 
In Sweden and Turco v Council, a judgment pertaining to the interpretation of the exception legal 
advice with regard to a request of access to a legal opinion of the Council’s legal service, the Court 
of Justice, deciding in grand chamber, established with all clarity a tripartite test that, in line with 
the principle of strict interpretation of the exceptions, the institutions must follow when examining 
                                               
57 E.g. Sweden and Turco v Council, para 45 (referring to “the public interest in the document being made accessible in 
the light of the advantages stemming… from increased openness”); Access Info Europe v Commission, T-851/16, 
EU:T:2018:69, para 98; Liam Campbell v Commission, Case T-312/17, EU:T:2018:876, para. 64; and Loreto Sumner v 
Commission, Case T-152/17, EU:T:2018:875, para. 64. 
58 L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA op. cit., pp. 159, pointing out that “to date there has been no successful 
identification of any [overriding public interest] by the applicant”. See too, D. ADAMSKI, « Approximating a Workable 
Compromise on Access to Official Documents: The 2011 Developments in the European Courts » Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 49, 2012, pp. 521-558, p. 526 and 543. Holding that the “public interest in question must be 
exceptional and pressing” given its function, see Opinion of AG HOGAN delivered on 11 September 2019 in PTC 
Therapeutics Ltd v European Medicines Agency (EMA), Case C-175/18 P, EU:C:2019:709, para 123 and 128. Equally 
restrictive, see CBA v Commission, para 55 and 56. 
59 Article 4(6) Regulation 1049/2001. See, further, L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA op. cit., pp. 147-151. 
60 E.g. Sison v Council, Case C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75, para 63; Sweden v Commission, Case C-64/05 P, para 66; Sweden 
and Turco v Council, para 36; Sweden and Others v API and Commission, para 73; Sweden v Commission and MyTravel Case 
C-506/08 P, EU:C:2011:496, , para 75; Case C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v Commission [2018], para 78. 
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a request on access to documents.61 In order to assess whether the document requested falls within 
one of the exceptions, the institution must: first, “satisfy itself that the document which it is asked 
to disclose does indeed relate to [the pertinent exception] and, if so, it must decide which parts of 
it are actually concerned and may, therefore, be covered by that exception”, calling on the 
institution to examine the content of the document beyond the way it is named;62 secondly, the 
institution “must examine whether disclosure of the parts of the document in question which have 
been identified as relating to [a specific exception] ‘would undermine the protection’ of [the 
interest protected]”, specifying that “the risk of that interest being undermined must, in order to 
be capable of being relied on, be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical”;63 thirdly, in the case 
of an exception subject to the public interest test, once the risk of harm to the protected interest 
has been established, the institution must “ascertain whether there is any overriding public interest 
justifying disclosure despite the fact that [the interest protected] would thereby be undermined”, 
balancing therefore the two competing interests that point in opposite directions: secrecy and 
disclosure.64 
The requirement of establishing a reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical risk 
in disclosure is set aside in the, by now, extensive number of cases where the institutions are 
allowed to invoke a general presumption of non-disclosure. Where such a presumption applies, 
the institution concerned does not have a duty to examine specifically and individually the 
                                               
61 But also laid down the seed for the subsequent case law on general presumptions: Sweden and Turco v Council, para 50 
(as noted by L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA op. cit., p. 154). See too Judgement of 29 June 2010, Commission v 
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, C 139/07 P, EU:C:2010:376, para 54. 
62 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 38 and 39 (“over and above the way a document is described, it is for the institution 
to satisfy itself that that document does indeed concern such advice”). 
63 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 40 and 43, emphasis added. The regulation indicates that a different standard of harm 
applies to the exceptions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 4 (access shall be denied when “disclosure would undermine 
the protection” of the interests specified therein), on the one hand, and to the exceptions of paragraph 3 of the same 
article (where access shall be denied if “disclosure would seriously undermine the protection” of the institution’s 
decision-making process; emphasis added). See, in this respect, Judgment of 22 January 2020, PTC Therapeutics 
International Ltd v EMA, C-175/18 P, EU:C:2020:23, para 90 and Opinion of AG HOGAN in PTC Therapeutics v EMA, 
cit., para 104 to 110). 
64 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 44 and 45. On the importance of keeping the second and third step separate, in line 
with the scheme of the exceptions of Article 4(2) and (3), criticizing subsequent case law (specifically, Judgments of 
17 October 2013, Council v Access Info Europe, C-280/11 P, EU:C:2013:671, and of 3 July 2014, Council v in’t Veld, 
C-350/12 P, EU:C:2014:2039) for failing to do so, and suggesting that the Court should clarify this matter, see 
Opinion of AG HOGAN in PTC Therapeutics v EMA, cit., para 115 to 119, 121, 127 and 128. For an example of other 
judgments where the Court has ruled that the weighing of interests takes place at the second stage, see Case T-852/16, 
Access Info Europe (EU Turkey Agreement), para 61, following the judgments that, according to AG HOGAN, stand to 
be corrected. The Court, however, did not seem to see reason for correction (referring neither explicitly to the opinion, 
nor to the case law mentioned therein) and upholding the General Court on the relevant point (PTC Therapeutics v 
EMA, para 86). 
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documents requested. Such a duty would, in fact, render the general presumption ineffective.65 In 
this second line of cases, the Court started off by shielding specific legal regimes of access to 
documents – set out in sector or, otherwise, specific laws ruling access to the file in state aids 
procedures, merger control, tender procedures (to which the general EU financial regulation 
applies), cartels, competition infringement procedures, or rules governing proceedings before the 
EU courts – from the impact that access granted under Regulation 1049/2001 to persons 
otherwise blocked therefrom could have on the respective procedure.66 In doing so, it also, 
arguably, shielded the regime of public access to documents from applicants (and litigants) that 
sought, thereby, to circumvent the limits on access to administrative files set out in specific 
legislation. Thus, in a state aid procedure, on appeal lodged by the Commission and judging again 
in grand chamber format, the Court of Justice held that the institutions may rely, for refusal of 
disclosure, on general presumptions applicable to “certain categories of documents”, on the 
grounds that “considerations of a generally similar kind are likely to apply to requests for disclosure 
relating to documents of the same nature”.67 This was the first of many other cases where a general 
presumption could be inferred from the existence of sectoral law that defines, in each instance, 
the conditions under which the documents pertaining to an administrative file may be accessed.68 
If persons interested in the procedure, who are not entitled to obtain access to the file under sector 
law – in this case, state aid law – would be given access on the basis of Regulation 1049/2001, “the 
system for the review of state aid would be called into question”.69 It is, hence, the nature of the 
procedure that is in question, as the Court explains: 
                                               
65 Judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, 
paragraph 83; reiterated, inter alia, at: Judgement of 11 May 2017, Case C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission, 
EU:C:2017:356 (Spirlea), para 47; Judgment of 4 September 2018, C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v Commission, para 52; PTC 
Therapeutics v EMA, para 59. This has natural implications for the content of the statement of reasons of a decision to 
refuse access, which does not presuppose an examination of the documents requested: see Judgment of the General 
Court of 14 May 2019, Case T-751/17, Commune de Fessenheim and Others v Commission, EU:T:2019:330 para 69 to 76. 
66 See, respectively, Judgment of 29 June 2010, Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, Case C-139/07 P (state aids); 
Judgment of 28 June 2012, Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, Case C-404/10 P, EU:C:2012:393 (merger control); 
Judgment of 29 January 2013, Joined Cases T-339/10 and T-532/10, Cosepuri v EFSA, T-339/10, EU:T:2013:38 
(tenders); Judgment of 27 February 2014, Commission v EnBW, C-365/12 P, EU:C:2014:112 (competition infringement 
procedures); Judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden and Others v API and Commission, C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and 
C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541 (rules applicable to Court procedures). 
67 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 54, citing the possibility that Sweden and Turco had left open (see above footnote 61) 
68 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 55 to 58. For other judgments where specific legislation was at stake, see further 
references above (footnote 66). Defending the non-recognition of general presumptions in cases where such 
legislation was absent, see Opinion AG VILLALLÓN delivered on 16 May 2013 in Case C-280/11 P, Council v Access 
Info Europe, EU:C:2013:325, para 75, and Opinion AG SHARPSTON delivered on 17 November 2016 in Case 
C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission, (Spirlea), EU:C:2016:885, para 40. 
69 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 58, emphasis added. 
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“It is true that the right to consult the administrative file in the context of a [State aid] review 
procedure (…) and the right of access to documents, pursuant to Regulation No 1049/2001 are 
legally distinct, but the fact remains that they lead to a comparable situation from a practical point of view. 
Whatever the legal basis on which it is granted, access to the file enables the interested parties to 
obtain all the observations and documents submitted to the Commission, and, where appropriate, 
adopt a position on those matters in their own observations, which is likely to modify the nature of such 
a procedure”.70 
The Court is, hereby, recognizing the power shifts that ensue from transparency and, at 
the same time, acknowledging that, the specific context in which the right of access to documents 
is exercised – “the particular circumstances of the individual case” that the Commission had 
invoked in this case71 – matters for the decision on whether to grant access or not. This is, however, 
a very fine thread to straddle on. The potential to restrict, by this very logic, the possibility of 
citizens or non-for-profit interest groups to improve the transparency of the institutions 
procedures is large, as shown as the case law evolved and extended the scope of general 
presumptions to instances where no specific legislation applied.72  
The judgment in Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau set two other important precedents. First, the 
Court distinguished the cases in which the institutions “act in the capacity of a legislature, in which 
wider access to documents should be authorized pursuant to recital 6 of Regulation No 
1049/2001, as was the case in Sweden and Turco v Council” from cases in which they act “within the 
framework of administrative functions specifically allocated to the said institutions [in this case] 
by Article 88 EC”.73 It, thereby, consolidated a diving line that Turco started to draw. 
Secondly, the Court specified – and has done ever since in cases where it admits general 
presumptions of non-disclosure – that the applicant has the possibility to demonstrate that the 
document withheld is not covered by the presumption, or, that, in the case of the exceptions of 
Article 4(2) and (3) that there is an “overriding public interest” justifying disclosure.74 Not only 
                                               
70 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 59. 
71 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 41 and 42. 
72 Examples where citizens or non-for-profit interest groups have been denied access in such circumstances are the 
judgments in C 514/11 P and C 605/11 P, LPN and Finland v Commission, EU:C:2013:738, which has become settled 
case law in infringement procedures (see, further, Section 4.2 below); Case C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission (Spirlea), 
EU:C:2017:356 (see footnote 126, below); Judgment of 13 November 2015, ClientEarth v Commission, Joined Cases T-
424/14 and T-425/14, EU:T:2015:848 (admitting a general presumption covering documents produced in impact 
assessment procedures, and set aside on appeal by Judgment of 4 September 2018, C-57/16 P, ClientEarth v Commission; 
see, further, Section 4.1 below). 
73 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 60. 
74 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 62. C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P, LPN and Finland v Commission, EU:C:2013:738, 
paragraph 66 and 94; Case C-562/14 P, Sweden v Commission, EU:C:2017:356 (Spirlea), para 46 and para where this 
possibility is examined (para 55 to 59); Association Justice & Environment v Commission, Case T-727/15,  EU:T:2017:18 
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this places a burden of proof on the applicant which Regulation 1049/2001 has not envisaged,75 
but also, considering that the applicant has not had access to the document, the threshold placed 
by the Court amounts to a probatio diabolica. The Court has equated the rebuttal of the presumption 
with the demonstration of the existence of an overriding public interest, where exceptions of 
Article 4(2) and Article 4(3) are at stake.76 In a case where the applicant sought access to documents 
produced in an environmental infringement procedure, with the purpose (which it needs not state) 
of securing public consultation in a national administrative procedure on air pollution plans, the 
Court held that “it is for the applicant to demonstrate precisely in what way disclosure of the 
documents at issue would contribute to assuring protection of human health and the environment 
and would prevail in the present case over protection of the purpose of the investigations in [that 
specific] infringement procedure”.77 General considerations do not suffice, effectively blocking, 
contrary to the Court’s assessment, access to documents in cases where general presumptions are 
invoked.78 
 
B. Between the ‘specific circumstances of the case at hand’ and matters of principle 
Most commentators have, rightly, denounced this line of case law as contrary to the spirit of the 
regulation, that is, as contrary to its democratic rationale and as excessively and non-justifiably 
curbing a fundamental right.79 Yet, as indicated above, the case law justifies a more nuanced 
analysis. The Court is correct in seeking to strike a balance between the regime of public access to 
                                               
para. 48 and 49 (stressing, at para 80, that “the case-law has already established that the existence of certain general 
presumptions does not result in depriving the right of access to documents of all practical effect, given that the general 
presumptions at issue are not irrefutable”). 
75 P. LEINO, “Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Access to 
Documents” Common Market Law Review, Vol. 48, 2011, 1215, at 1251. 
76 LPN and Finland v Commission, cit., para 66. 
77 Case T-727/15, Association Justice & Environment v Commission, para 52. The applicant had stated that it was “not in a 
position to prove what concrete information contained in the requested documents could specifically be used to 
improve these problems of air pollution” (para 21) and asked the Court to revise its case law in cases pertaining to 
information on environmental infringement procedures, for the sake of transparency (para 35 to 37; see in this regard, 
para 67 to 79). 
78 Ibidem, para 53 to 62. See, further, L. ROSSI AND P. VINAGRE E SILVA op. cit., pp. 160-163. For a recent example, see 
CBA v Commission, para 52 to 62. 
79 See, e.g. O. BROUWER AND J. BLOCKX, « Access to Documents Relating to EU Competition and State Aid Cases 
Pursuant to Regulation 1049/2001: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption as a "Fig Leaf" for Intransparency?, in 
BAUMÉ/ELFERINK/PHOA/THIAVILLE (Hrsg.), Today’s Multilayered Legal Order: Current Issues and Perspective: Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Arjen W.H. Meij, Paris, 2011, p. 39, at p. 49; A.M. KOPPENSTEINER, « Die 
Transparenzverordnung im Wandel der Zeit », Europarecht 2014, 594, p. 602-605, calling for a consideration of the 
limits of general presumptions in the revision of the regulation on access to documents; D. CURTIN and P. LEINO, « 
Openness, Transparency and the Right of Access to Documents in the EU », p. 9-12. 
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documents, on the one hand, and specific procedural regimes established by the legislature. The 
latter have been defined, presumably, on the basis of a careful consideration of the conditions that 
ensure both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the procedure. General presumptions may tip 
the balance too much in favour of the protection of the nature of the procedure, dismissing all too 
easily any considerations that could be drawn from the democratic rationale of access to 
documents. They effectively have had this result and should be criticized from this perspective.80 
But the need to make this balance, at the stage of verifying the applicability of the exception, is a defensible 
stance, when backed by (sector) rules adopted through a legislative procedure. It is not excluded 
that general presumptions can be a good outcome of such balance. The grounds for such general 
presumption are, however, much shakier when there are no such specific legal rules on access to 
a file, or when such rules are soft law rules enacted by the very institution that can rely on general 
presumptions. Such is the case of Commission infringement procedures, where effective access to 
documents is, by force of the application of general presumptions, virtually in the sole hands of 
the institution (at least as the case law stands hitherto). As will be seen in more detail below, the 
application of general presumptions to the Commission infringement procedures is, in part for 
this reason, a step too far in the direction of confidentiality of public documents. 
It is equally problematic that there is currently a significant uncertainty regarding the 
criteria governing the recognition of these presumptions and the way they are applied.81 This is all 
the more worrying when, more recently, the Court of Justice made clear that the application of a 
general presumption is “always optional for the EU institution, body, office or agency”.82 
Combined with the lack of criteria mentioned, this stance leaves the scope of access in the hands 
of the requested institution or body. The existence of specific rules (from which may be derived 
the need to protect the nature of the procedure from access to documents granted under 
Regulation 1049/2001) is no longer a necessary condition for the recognition of a general 
presumption, since the Court of Justice first recognized the application of general presumptions 
                                               
80 Depending on how they are applied, they potentially withdraw whole categories of documents from the scope of 
Regulation 1049/2001. In addition to the probation diabolica mentioned above, the way the Court has ruled pleas of 
partial access in cases where it has recognised the general presumption confirms this conclusion: see, e.g. Commission 
v Éditions Odile Jacob, cit., paragraph 133, holding that the general presumption indicates “that the documents covered 
by [the exceptions] do not fall within an obligation of disclosure, in full or in part, of their content”, reiterated, inter 
alia, at Case T-312/17, Liam Campbell v Commission, para 47. 
81 For a reflection of this uncertainty, see the diverging views of the General Court and of the parties manifested in 
the Opinion of AG HOGAN in PTC Therapeutics v EMA, cit., para 25 and 45 to 50. At stake was the possibility to 
extend the case law on general presumptions to clinical study reports that are part of the procedure to obtain a market 
authorization of pharmaceutical products. 
82 PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v EMA, para 61 and 62 (emphasis added). 
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to EU Pilot procedures’ documents, in the context of EU law infringements.83 Necessary 
conditions appear to be, to date, the existence of a set of documents pertaining to a file relating to 
ongoing administrative or judicial proceedings, involving only specific categories of procedures.84 
But it is not excluded that other categories of general presumptions may be recognised.85 On which 
grounds – whether prudential (to prevent a lower degree of protection of the interests covered by 
the exceptions of Article 4) or normative (to preserve the democratic function of the rules on 
access to documents) – remains unclear, but, at present, prudential reasons seem to prevail.86 The 
prediction of AG Sharpston in the Spirlea case, associating, on the one hand, the absence of specific 
rules governing a procedure and, on the other, the uncertain scope of “any exception to the general 
principle of transparency” based on the purpose and nature of the procedure, appears to have 
materialized.87  
A minimum condition to prevent general presumptions from withdrawing whole 
categories of documents from the scope of Regulation 1049/2001 is to impede their automatic 
application to each category of documents already covered by such presumptions.88 They are, as 
the Court admits, an exception to the rule of strict interpretation of the exceptions to access, which 
the regulation postulates, and need to be maintained as such. In each case, the Court ought to 
carefully consider the position of the requesting “citizen” (any person using Regulation 1049/2001 
is, as matter of law, acting in that quality) and the relevance of the democratic rationale of the 
regime of public access to documents in the circumstances in which it is called upon to decide. As 
such, the reiteration of the fact that “the institution concerned is not required to base its decision 
on a general presumption”, where this has been previously established,89 is of little avail to prevent 
the systematic application of general presumptions where they have been previously recognized. 
The fact that the decision of applying a general presumption is a faculty of the institution (“always 
optional”, as the Court of Justice clarified) leaves the door open to such systematic application on 
the part of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.   
                                               
83 Sweden v Commission (Spirlea), cit., para 44 and 45. 
84 E.g Case T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, para 82, stating that the number of documents is not a decisive criterion.  
85 In this sense, Opinion of AG HOGAN in PTC Therapeutics v EMA, cit., para 65. 
86 That much results from Client Earth as applied by AG HOGAN in its opinion PTC Therapeutics v EMA, cit., para 78 
to 80 (on Client Earth see further below, section 4.1). 
87 Opinion AG SHARPSTON in Sweden v Commission (Spirlea), cit., para 51. 
88 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 50. For a concrete application see Judgment of 4 October 2018, Daimler AG v 
Commission, Case T-128/14, EU:T:2018:643, para 152 to 164.  
89 The argument is that the institution may always choose to carry out a specific examination of the requested 
documents and take a decision on that basis. See, inter alia, in Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, paragraph 62; 
Sweden and Others v API and Commission, paragraph 103; Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob, paragraph 126; LPN and Finland 
v Commission, para 67. See, in addition, PTC Therapeutics International Ltd v EMA, para 61 and 62. 
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A closer examination of how the Courts have interpreted some of the exceptions will show 
the fields of activity of the EU that the institutions have hitherto sought to carve out from the 
principle of transparency. To the extent the Courts admitted, they have been insulated from the 
developments that have placed EU decision-making under the pressure of democratic claims. The 
analysis below also allows us to get a better sense of how the institutions perceive the role of 
transparency in specific procedures (whether or not this is shared by the Courts), and, in given 
cases, of the criteria governing the application of general presumptions of non-disclosure.  
4. Some concrete borderlines between democracy and confidentiality  
4.1. Legislative and administrative documents 
The judgments in Sweden and Turco and in Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau have generated a distinction 
in the case law between documents produced in the context of legislative procedures, with regard 
to which the principle of democracy requires a more favourable regime of access, and those 
produced in the context of administrative procedures, where reasons of democracy are not as 
pressing or at all applicable. In Sweden and Turco, the Court stressed that increased transparency, 
citizens’ closer participation in EU decision-making processes, legitimacy and accountability to the 
citizen “are clearly of particular relevance where [the institutions are] acting in [their] legislative 
capacity”.90 In Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, the Court noted the contrast between, on the one hand, 
situations “where the Community institutions act in the capacity of a legislature, in which wider 
access to documents should be authorised pursuant to recital 6 of Regulation No 1049/2001”, 
and, on the other, documents that “fall within the framework of administrative functions”.91 This 
distinction became further entrenched as the case law on general presumptions evolved.92  
It is noteworthy that, although the regulation and primary law attach particular importance 
to the principle of transparency in the case of legislative procedures (as the Court has emphasized 
in several occasions),93 the regulation also establishes one single regime of access to documents, 
                                               
90 Sweden and Turco v Council, para 45 and 46. See too C-280/11 P, Council v Access Info Europe, para 33 and 63 (but see 
para 72 to 74, leaving open the possibility that a general presumption could apply in the context of a legislative 
procedure). 
91 Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau, para 60. See also Judgment of 21 September 2010, Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission, C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P, EU:C:2010:541, para 77. Not long thereafter, in My Travel, AG 
KOKOTT held that “administrative activities do not require the same breadth of access to documents as legislative 
activities of the EU institutions” (Opinion delivered on 3 March 2011, in Case C-506/08 P, Sweden v Commission, para 
60). The General Court had adopted the same position in the judgment at first, a few months after the Court of Justice 
had pronounced its Turco judgement (MyTravel v Commission, Case T-403/05, para 49). 
92 E.g. Client Earth v Commission, Case C-612/13 P, para 78. 
93 Article 15(2) TFEU, recital 6 and Article 12(2) of Regulation 1049/2001. 
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without distinction. For this reason, the lower transparency currently afforded to administrative 
documents can be considered incompatible with the regulation.94 But the unitary character of the 
legal regime of Regulation 1049/2001, read in the light of the current case law, can also still be the 
ground to declare a general presumption with regard to documents of a legislative nature. This 
possibility is, admittedly, remote, as it would require the Court to overrule a significant part of its 
stance in Turco and following case law, where it has always stressed the special position of legislative 
documents. It would, furthermore, be deeply problematic, considering the above critique of 
general presumptions. Yet, formally, it is a possibility that does not appear to be fully ruled out.95 
The judgment in De Capitani, pertaining to a request of access to documents produced in the 
context of trialogues, and an important hallmark regarding one controversial aspect of the EU 
legislative procedures,96 is illustrative in this respect.  
As in previous cases, also in De Capitani, the General Court, relying on the democratic 
relevance of transparency in legislative procedures, singled out the specificity of legislative 
documents that, as a matter of principle, would make the recognition of a general presumption 
impossible in such cases. “The principles of publicity and transparency”, the Court held, are 
“inherent to the EU legislative process”, by force of both primary law and of the regulation on 
access to documents.97 The Court, therefore, made clear that, for this reason, considerations of 
effectiveness of the legislative procedure cannot justify secrecy.98 Accordingly, those same 
principles preclude the application of a general presumption.99 But the General Court refrained 
from such a principled statement. It noted, instead, that the Court of Justice has never recognized 
a general presumption with regard to legislative documents.100 It further emphasized that general 
presumptions have been recognized always with regard to “specific proceedings” and not to a 
general category of documents. In the case at hand, applying a presumption to documents 
produced in trialogues could “cover, by definition, all fields of legislative activity”.101 In this line of 
                                               
94 D. CURTIN and P. LEINO, « Openness, Transparency and the Right of Access to Documents in the EU. In-
Depth Analysis for the PETI Committee », 2016, p. 9-12. 
95 Council v Access Info Europe, Case C-280/11 P, para 72 to 74, as noted in footnote 90 above. 
96 See D. CURTIN and P. LEINO, « In Search for Transparency in EU Lawmaking: Trilogues in the Cusp of Dawn», 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 54, 2017, 1673-1712. 
97 Case T-540/15, De Capitani v Parliament, para 81 and 78 to 80.  
98 De Capitani v Parliament, para 83, 98, 99, 103 and 105. 
99 AG BOT made such a principled statement in his opinion in C-57/16 P, ClientEarth (not, as such, repeated by the 
Court), associating the need to provide wider access to impact assessments and the respective reports (given their 
intrinsic link to a legislative procedure) with the preclusion of a general presumption (para 69). 
100 De Capitani v Parliament, para 82 
101 De Capitani v Parliament, para 109. 
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reasoning, the specificity of the procedure – rather than the democratic principle of transparency 
underlining legislative procedures – remains a decisive criterion. Undoubtedly, the specific 
importance of transparency with regard to legislative procedures is a strong argument to deny the 
application of general presumptions in this context. Yet, the Courts (unlike the Advocate Generals) 
have not yet made such a principled statement, having had that opportunity.102  
The fact remains that, as stated in de Capitani, the Courts hitherto have always refused to 
place legislative documents under the scope of general presumptions of non-disclosure. The 
special position that “decisions” and “decision-making process” acquire in the context of a 
legislative procedure,103 ultimately raises the issue of what counts as a legislative and as an 
administrative document, or when an institution is acting in one or the other capacity. The question 
arose with regard to documents produced during impact assessment procedures. In ClientEarth, 
the General Court held that the Commission does not act in a legislative capacity when it prepares 
or develops a proposal for an act, “even a legislative act”, with the result that the democratic 
rationale of disclosure in legislative procedures did not preclude the application of a general 
presumption of non-disclosure to draft impact assessment reports (and to the related reports of 
the Impact Assessment Board).104 The Court of Justice, judging on appeal, decided otherwise. 
Legislative documents are, in accordance with Article 12(2) of the Regulation 1049/2001, 
“documents drawn up or received in the course of procedures for the adoption of acts which are 
legally binding in or for the Member States”.105 Even if in the phase leading up to the adoption of 
a legislative proposal the Commission does not act in a legislative capacity, the Commission is a 
“key player in the legislative process” by virtue of the powers of initiative that the Treaty gave it 
and the documents produced during impact assessments contain “important elements of the EU 
legislative process”.106 These documents benefit, therefore, from the wider access that the 
regulation recognized to legislative documents. The Court of Justice noted as well that “the impact 
assessment procedure is not a type of procedure which, as such, has features that preclude in 
principle full transparency”.107 In this case, the general considerations on which the General Court 
                                               
102 See Opinion of AG BOT in C-57/16 P, ClientEarth, para 64, pointing the nature of the document as a decisive for 
the application of a wider access to documents (in that case, it was contraposed not to the specificity of the procedure 
as an additional criterion, but to the capacity - legislative or otherwise - in which an institution acts). 
103 De Capitani v Parliament, para 79. 
104 General Court ClientEarth v Commission, para 102-103. 
105 ClientEarth v Commission, para 85. 
106 ClientEarth v Commission, para 86 to 88 and 91. 
107 ClientEarth v Commission, para 103. 
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grounded the recognition of a general presumption did not support the finding of a risk to the 
Commission’s decision-making process.108 
This conclusion was in conformity with the Court of Justice’s statement of principle 
regarding the recognition of a general presumption “in respect of a new category of documents”: 
the institution invoking a presumption ought first to show “that it is reasonably foreseeable that 
disclosure of the type of document falling within that category would be liable actually to 
undermine the interest protected by the exception in question”.109 The Court took the opportunity 
to clarify that “such a risk depends on factors such as the state of completion of the document in 
question and the precise stage of the decision-making process in question at the time when access 
to that document is refused, the specific context in which that process takes place, and the issues 
still to be discussed internally by the institution concerned.”110 Once again, an EU Court – this 
time the Court of Justice deciding in grand chamber – refrained from a principled statement that 
general presumptions of non-disclosure are not applicable to legislative documents, while not 
failing to stress, once again, the particular importance of transparency in legislative procedures.111 
4.2. Infringement procedures 
Infringement procedures occupy a “special position within the system of access to documents”.112 
Although with deeper roots in the case law,113 such principled position was clearly stated in the 
LPN judgment, where for the first time the Court of Justice extended the case law on general 
presumptions to the pre-litigation procedures conducted under Article 258 TFEU.114 It did so by 
upholding the judgment of the General Court, which had relied on an argument of analogy with 
the Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau judgment on state aids procedures.115 The applicant had requested 
“a set of documents, described as a whole, appearing in the file relating to the infringement 
procedure”, which was still ongoing.116 The conditions to transpose the general presumption that 
                                               
108 ClientEarth v Commission, para 105, 108, 110. 
109 ClientEarth v Commission, para 80. As mentioned above, it is on this basis that AG HOGAN has more recently 
proposed the extension of a general presumption to a new category of non-legislative documents (see above footnotes 
85 and 86). 
110 ClientEarth v Commission, para 111. 
111 Notably at ClientEarth v Commission, para 104 and  
112 LPN and Finland v Commission, C 514/11 P and C 605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, para 55. Reiterated in Case T-312/17, 
Liam Campbell v Commission, para 32 and in Case T-152/17, Loreto Sumner v Commission, EU:T:2018:875, para 34. 
113 D. ADAMSKI (2009) « How Wide is the “Widest Possible”? Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to Right of 
Access to Official Documents Revisited », Vol. 46 Common Market Law Review, pp 521-549, at pp. 538-41. 
114 See references in footnote 112 
115 Cite GC *** paras 126 and following. 
116 LPN and Finland v Commission, para 49 and 50 (see, also, Case T-727/15, Association Justice & Environment, para 45). 
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the Court had defended in previous cases were fulfilled.117 It is noteworthy, however, that the 
applicant was an association constituted under Portuguese law established with the objective to 
protect the environment. That same association had been monitoring compliance by a Member 
State with EU law on biodiversity and was at the origin of the complaint leading to the 
infringement procedure in that instance. 
The arguments were three-fold, all upholding the special position of infringement 
procedures. First, these have “characteristics [that preclude] full transparency”.118 This argument 
was made based on a norm of the Aarhus regulation that excludes infringement procedures from 
boarder access to environmental information. Yet, the General Court has later on ruled that the 
existence of a specific set of legislative provisions providing for stricter rules of access to 
documents is irrelevant for the application of a general presumption.119 Second, the Court held 
that those characteristics are similar to the ones of stated aid review procedures at stake in the 
Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau judgment: there is a bilateral procedure involving the Member State 
investigated and the Commission, in relation to which EU law does not recognize a “right for an 
individual to consult the file”, regardless of that individual being the complainant that initiated the 
infringement procedure.120 Thirdly, this is a procedure characterized by the discretion of the 
Commission with the double purpose of allowing the Member State to defend itself and enabling 
an agreement that can put an end to the putative infringement.121 Therefore, the Court concluded: 
“the disclosure of the documents concerning an infringement procedure during its pre-litigation 
stage would … be likely to change the nature and progress of that procedure, given that, in those 
circumstances, it could prove even more difficult to begin a process of negotiation and to reach 
an agreement between the Commission and the Member State concerned putting an end to the 
infringement alleged, in order to enable European Union law to be respected and to avoid legal 
proceedings”.122 Disclosure of documents during an infringement procedure is detrimental to the 
“climate of trust” that needs to exist between the two parties concerned – the Commission and 
                                               
117 LPN and Finland v Commission, para 47. On the conditions for the application of the presumption, see further 
C-612/13 P, ClientEarth v Commission, EU:C:2015:486, para 59 to 63 (regarding the concept of “investigations”), 70 
(regarding the categories of documents) and para 79 (delimiting the scope of those documents). 
118 LPN and Finland v Commission, para 55. 
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the Member State – to facilitate the adoption of a “consensual solution” in case of a detection of 
an infringement procedure.123 This has been settled case law since.124 
This special nature of the procedure – as established by the Court – is the key of the 
judgment, and of other rulings that confirmed the Court’s position in LPN. The ground for the 
general presumption is neither the need to reconcile different regimes of access to information, 
nor, in reality, an argument of analogy with state aid review procedures, but the shielding of a 
procedure that has kept its diplomatic nature since the very beginning of EU integration.125 The 
exclusion of access to documents in infringement procedures, as an effect of the general application 
of a general presumption of confidentiality, shows clearly the hard borders of democratic 
arguments in EU law. No argument regarding the public interest character of the request made, 
or the special position of environmental associations to ensure compliance with environmental 
law (as international and EU law acknowledge), or the fact that at stake is the protection of diffuse 
rights of the EU citizens and the public enforcement of those rights, is capable of overriding the 
confidential nature of EU infringement procedures as they have originally been designed in EU 
law. That much is confirmed in subsequent case law (in Spirlea, Client Earth, and Association Justice 
& Environment).126 The Court considered the purpose of the request (i.e. supplementing the 
information held by the Commission on the infringement at stake) irrelevant to the effect of 
establishing an overriding public interest that could have justified disclosure.127 The fact that it 
required LPN to rely on specific circumstances to prove the presence of an overriding public 
interest – something it arguably could not have proven without having access to the documents it 
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requested – shows that the Court admits an automatic application of the general presumptions, 
without consideration of the specific circumstances of the case to which it applies and without 
consideration for the democratic rationale of Regulation 1049/2001.128 The message is clear: when 
it comes to infringement procedures, it is the Commission alone who gets to define which 
information to be made public, by ensuring that “the public is informed about the progress of 
specific infringement cases through the regular publication of press releases”.129 
4.3. Investigations 
Many of the cases where general presumptions have been recognised, including Commission 
infringement proceedings, have involved the protection of the purpose of investigations, under 
Article 4(2), 3rd indent of Regulation 1049/2001. For this reason, the delimitation of the concept 
of investigations has the potential to restrict or broaden significantly the scope of access to 
documents.130 This issue arose in a case involving documents exchanged between a Member State 
and the Commission in the context of a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations (Schlyter).131 According to EU law, national initiatives for the 
establishment of technical standards or regulations must be transparent.132 Member States need to 
communicate to the Commission draft technical regulations and their grounds, which must, in 
addition, be circulated among Member States. The purpose of this procedure is to enable the 
Commission and the other Member States to assess the possible internal market obstacles deriving 
from such initiatives and to enable the relevant Member State to accommodate the comments 
received in a final version of their own regulations. In this way, it is possible to avoid the adoption 
of national technical regulations that constitute an internal market obstacle.133 At first sight, these 
are regulatory procedures that ought, as a matter of principle, be in the public domain. While 
involving an assessment of compliance with EU law, little would indicate the need for 
confidentiality. This was, however, a contentious issue in Schlyter, pertaining to access to a 
                                               
128 Very much in the same line of LPN, see Association Justice & Environment v Commission, para 52 to 61. 
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130 While this observation applies irrespective of the recognition of general presumptions, the impact of the latter in 
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Commission’s detailed opinion on a draft regulation submitted by France, while the procedure 
remained open. 
The divergent positions expressed in this case regarding the purpose of this procedure and, 
particularly, what could undermine it, are paradigmatic of how differently the individual Member 
States and the Commission view the place of transparency in this context. France and the 
Commission sought to establish an analogy with infringement procedures, holding that, after the 
Commission issued a detailed opinion in the context of the said procedure, the “quality of the 
dialogue” between the Commission and the Member State needed to be protected.134 The 
Commission added that “those negotiations must be protected from any external pressure, for the 
Commission is trying to convince the Member State concerned that its draft national legislation 
could be incompatible with EU law and, often, suggests alternative solutions”.135 Disclosure, in 
this case, undermines the “spirit of mutual trust” and the “willingness [of the Member State 
concerned] to cooperate”, public information having thus a disruptive effect.136 Finland and 
Sweden disagreed that the procedure could even be considered an investigation for the purposes 
of Article 4(2), third paragraph.137 It is noteworthy that, as mentioned, at stake were drafts of 
national general norms on technical standards, their rationale, the possible obstacles to the internal 
market that they may pose, and the possible ways to make them conform to EU law. 
Judging on appeal, the Court of Justice took a relatively broad definition of investigations, 
capable of encompassing the procedure at hand, disagreeing in this respect with the General Court. 
According to the Court of Justice, investigations are “structured and formalised Commission 
procedure[s] that ha[ve] the purpose of collecting and analysing information in order to enable the 
institution to take a position in the context of its functions provided for by the EU and FEU 
Treaties.”138 Investigations, in the view of the Court, need not have the purpose of detecting an 
offence or illegality and can even conclude with a recommendation and not with a binding 
decision.139 Yet, diverging fundamentally from the arguments that France and the Commission had 
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invoked, the Court did not consider that the purpose of the procedure required confidentiality. It 
rightly recalled that the procedure at stake, as envisaged in the applicable directive, was premised 
on transparency, including on the possibility of economic operators to issue opinions on the 
measures notified by a Member State.140 While it is not excluded that, in some cases, disclosure 
may indeed harm the purpose of the procedure (and hence may be refused on the basis of Article 
4(2), third paragraph), the risk of disrupting the cooperation between the Commission and the 
Member State concerned is not a sufficient reason to deny access. It falls upon the Commission 
to demonstrate the specific and actual risk of undermining the objective of the procedure, i.e. 
preventing the adoption of a technical regulation incompatible with EU law.141  
4.4. Well-motivated international secrecies? 
Treaties, agreements and positions taken by the EU in the international plane, covering a wide 
range of issues that can significantly impact on citizens’ rights and on the internal market (such as 
data, health and environmental protection) have gained increased public visibility in the last decade. 
Access to documents has been, as a result, at the core of heated debates on the limits of publicity 
of public action that has long stopped having effects limited to the diplomatic realm. The Courts’ 
position with regard to access to information pertaining to the content of international 
negotiations has been consistent since, at least, the in’t Veld cases.142 Thus, in view of the scope of 
the regulation on access to documents, transparency is a relevant consideration in international 
affairs, not least in a situation where the international agreements being negotiated may impact on 
the EU’s legislative activity.143 Yet, both the General Court and the Court of Justice equally 
acknowledge the difficulties that may ensue from disclosing the content of the positions to be 
adopted by the EU in international negotiations and the limits posed to public involvement by the 
need to avoid revealing strategic elements of the negotiations.144 Accordingly, both Courts have 
hitherto consistently stressed “the singularly sensitive and essential nature of the protected 
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interest” covered by the international relations exception, be it in cases where at stake was the 
disclosure of EU positions during international negotiations or not.145 Technically, the scheme of 
the exceptions in Article 4(1)(a) added further strength to the position of the Courts according to 
which the institutions enjoy wide discretion in assessing the possibility of harm to the protection 
of international relations. In fact, the exception is “framed in mandatory terms” (i.e. if the 
institution establishes a harm to the protection of international negotiations, it is “obliged to refuse 
access” and it is not required to balance such harm with an overriding public interest) and provides 
only “very general” criteria.146 The implication is well-known: in the face of broad discretionary 
decisions, the Court performs, in principle, a limited review of their legality.  
Based on these premises, the General Court has upheld refusals of access, inter alia, to: 
documents containing legal advice on a Commission recommendation to open negotiations with 
the US on data processing and exchange for purposes of police cooperation, which could reveal 
the objectives pursued by the EU in the negotiations;147 international negotiating documents 
relating to the draft Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement;148 negotiation directives given by the 
Council to the Commission in its capacity as negotiator of the EU’s accession agreement to the 
European Convention on Human Rights;149 emails containing comments by the Commission’s 
Legal Service on the treatment to be given to Syrian nationals in the framework of the EU-Turkey 
Agreement on the return and resettlement of migrants and irregular migration;150 documents 
pertaining to the legality of the Investment State Dispute Settlement and Investment Court System, 
as capable of disclosing the Union’s position on ongoing negotiations.151 On the other hand, it has 
recognised access to, inter alia: part of documents the disclosure of which is unlikely to damage 
the mutual trust between the negotiating parties;152 negotiating directives that had already been 
communicated to negotiating partners (the Council could no longer argue that disclosure would 
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effectively weaken the Union’s negotiation position);153 documents containing a legal assessment 
of the legislation of a Member State, not involving a position taken vis-à-vis a third State.154 
Overall, the openness that the case law has allowed for is rather limited.155 The Court is, in 
principle, opposed to disclosing negotiation directives that are not in the public domain, in order 
to preserve a climate of trust between negotiating partners and the international capacity of the 
EU.156 This includes precluding access to information on constitutional matters, such as the legal 
basis of the conclusion of the envisaged international agreement, if it can disclose the content of 
the Union’s position and cause sufficient harm to the protection of international relations, or, for 
the same reason, the way in which the Union envisaged its accession to the European Convention 
of Human Rights (a matter which the Court did not consider to be of constitutional nature).157 
The judgments are of course always based on an assessment of the position of the parties pleading 
in opposite directions, and the Court makes clear that the institutions wishing to preclude 
disclosure need to demonstrate before the court the existence of a specific and effective risk to 
the protection of international relations, not purely based on hypothetical scenarios, providing, to 
this extent, a sufficient protection of transparency.158 No general presumptions of non-disclosure 
apply in this case. Yet, “plausible explanations” based on general considerations (such as the 
possibility that documents include tactical considerations, the possibility that knowledge of 
negotiating directives might have been exploited by negotiating partners) can be sufficient to 
establish the required level of risk.159 In addition, summary statements are sufficient, at the risk of 
otherwise effectively disclosing information on the content of the documents that the institutions 
wish to withhold from the public domain, in view of Article 4(1)(a).160  
5. Pervasive, but not so much 
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Those who would hope to see in the advancement of transparency one of the signs of the 
democratic character of the EU can be either disappointed or rebutted in view of how the right of 
access to documents has evolved in EU law. Its nature as a citizens’ fundamental right (Article 42 
of the Charter) to be exercised in a polity progressively evolving towards an ideal of openness 
(Article 15(1) TFEU) has done little to break the spheres of confidentiality dictated by the “nature” 
of the EU procedures, despite significant exceptions where institutional practice was strongly in 
contrast with core tenets of representative democracy (such as, for example, the open nature of 
legislative deliberations, as in the case of trialogues).  
The above overview shows that, despite the progress towards increased transparency, a 
right ancillary to democratic claims can face significant barriers to change the nature of the polity 
and of the system of governance in which it is embedded. If in the field of external relations, the 
demands for secrecy can find justification in reasons equally accepted in the laws of the Member 
States, other settings involving state sovereignty within the EU reveal clearly how far both the 
Member States and the EU institutions (including the Court) are willing to go in transforming the 
EU into a polity where citizens are informed of the contours of public action. Not far, when it 
comes to Commission infringement procedures.  
Despite the encompassing wording of Regulation 1049/2001, it appears that access to 
documents – at least as interpreted by the Court – was never meant to transform the legal and 
constitutional set up of certain procedures, the closed character of infringement procedures being 
a case in point. In this respect, the Court’s interpretation of the regime on access to documents is 
preserving the effectiveness of EU law, by protecting the prerogatives of the Commission, 
conditioning the rationale of Regulation 1049/2001 accordingly. As before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, transparency is a principle that remains contingent on the needs of European 
integration (in addition to the protection of the interests specified in Regulation 1049/200) as the 
EU institutions define them. In the case of administrative procedures to which specific legal 
regimes apply, the application of general presumptions of non-disclosure shows that it is the task 
of the legislature to delineate the balance between openness and confidentiality, again carving out 
specific regimes of access to documents pertaining to an administrative file. That these prevail as 
lex specialis (as a result of the application of general presumptions) shows also, albeit in a different 
way, the boundaries of a transparency regime informed by the principle of democracy. Either 
sector rules take transparency as a relevant consideration in shaping specific regimes of access to 
files, or arguments based on the general regime on access to documents can hardly correct possible 
excesses in the direction of confidentiality, given the current obstacles to invert general 
presumptions where they are systematically applied. 
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The analysis in this chapter has also shown that the ambivalence of transparency, in 
particular in the context of EU integration, is an important consideration when making normative 
assessments of how far the EU is compliant with that constitutional principle. The functional roots 
of transparency in the EU remain present and cannot be ignored by those who advocate 
transparency as a democratic principle. In particular at a time in which the terms of the debate on 
transparency are changing under the pressure of ever more available information, of the concerns 
for privacy, and of the very way procedures are conducted via new technologies, a reflection on 
the meaning of transparency, its limits, usages and political effects in the EU is essential to define 
both possible needed reforms but also which public measures may be needed to realise the abstract 
ideals that it stands for. 
